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TORTURE, NECESSITY, AND SUPREME 
EMERGENCY:  LAW AND MORALITY AT THE 
END OF LAW 
Zachary R. Calo∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Torture[,]” Jean Bethke Elshtain writes, “invariably appears on the 
‘never’ list of the ‘forbiddens’ of human politics.”1  Few issues, after all, 
are more settled in law and ethics than torture.  As one commentator 
notes, “no other practice except slavery is so universally condemned in 
law and human convention as torture.”2  Torture is a practice that Cesare 
Beccaria, in a statement reflective of the new Enlightenment morality of 
the eighteenth century, denounced as a “residue of the most barbarous 
centuries[.]”3  “[T]he eradication of the moral and legal basis for 
torture[,]” Christopher Kutz writes, “has been one of the defining 
features of post-Enlightenment liberal politics.”4  Freedom from 
government torture is now unquestionably established as a foundational 
human right.  Indeed, the importance and clarity of the prohibition 
against torture is most evident from its seminal role in the modern 
human rights movement.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the founding document of the movement, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establish that no person shall be 
subjected to torture.  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment elaborates on this 
principle in a singular document, further emphasizing the defining role 
that this issue has had in the human rights movement.  Enlightenment 
political ideals, fulfilled in the idea of universal human rights, have 
embraced the principle that torture must be prohibited absolutely and 
unqualifiedly. 
In addition to its particular role in the human rights movement, 
opposition to torture also has been of seminal importance in constructing 
the liberal political imagination.  As David Luban argues, torture is 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  Ph.D. candidate, 
University of Virginia; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Virginia 
School of Law; M.A., The Johns Hopkins University; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University. 
1 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of “Dirty Hands,” in TORTURE:  A 
COLLECTION 77 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
2 John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1588 (2007). 
3 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 3 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., 2003). 
4 Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 239 
(2007). 
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fundamentally at odds with the liberal vision of politics and humanity 
because of the relationship it creates between torturer and victim:  “The 
self-conscious aim of torture is to turn its victim into someone who is 
isolated, overwhelmed, terrorized, and humiliated.  Torture aims to strip 
away from its victim all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism 
prizes.”5  “Liberalism[,]” by contrast, “incorporates a vision of engaged, 
active human beings possessing an inherent dignity regardless of their 
social situation.  The victim of torture is in every respect the opposite of 
this vision.”6  In fact, far from merely being in tension with liberal ideals, 
torture serves as a practice against which these ideals were defined and 
established.  As Michael Ignatieff remarked, “There is not much doubt 
that liberal democracy’s very history and identity is tied up in an 
absolute prohibition of torture.”7 
Opposition to torture has found a voice not merely in the secular 
morality of modernity, but also in religious traditions.8  The human 
rights movement has drawn deeply from the well of theological thought, 
even if unknowingly or unwittingly, particularly with respect to notions 
of human dignity.9  Of course, religious traditions have had a far-from-
consistent message on torture.  As Jeremy Waldron notes, “Torture 
historically has not always been beyond the pale from a Christian point 
of view.”10  Yet, it must be said that the ethical imperative against torture 
which has acquired such currency in the modern period is as much due 
to the labors of religious communities as it is to the high politics of 
human rights.  Lutheran theologian Helmut Thielicke, writing in the 
mid-twentieth century, offered the following comment on torture:  “If we 
make ourselves fundamentally unpredictable, i.e., if as Christians we 
think that torture is at least conceivable—perhaps under the exigencies 
of an extreme situation—we thereby reduce man to the worth of a 
convertible means, divest him of the imago Dei, and so deny the first 
commandment.”11  “Eternal as well as temporal issues” are at stake in 
                                                 
5 David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1430 
(2005). 
6 Id. at 1433. 
7 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:  POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 136 
(2004). 
8 On religion and human rights, see WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, TORTURE AND EUCHARIST 
(1998); TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE:  CHRISTIANS, JEWS, MUSLIMS, AND PEOPLE OF CONSCIENCE 
SPEAK OUT (George Hunsinger ed., 2008). 
9 John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(1996). 
10 Jeremy Waldron, The Injury Done by Christian Silence to Public Debate over America’s Use 
of Torture, 2 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 1, 10 (2008). 
11 HELMUT THIELICKE, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS, VOLUME 1:  FOUNDATIONS 646 (1966). 
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the issue of torture, Thielicke concludes.12  The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church similarly provides that, “Torture which uses physical or moral 
violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or 
satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human 
dignity.”13 
In law and ethics, and in worldviews, secular and sacred, opposition 
to torture has found clear expression unrivaled in the modern period.  
This principled opposition both reflects, and in no small measure helped 
to establish, the parameters of liberal politics.  The seminality of this 
principle makes the recent debate over torture’s permissibility all the 
more astounding.  No respectable thinker would propose reexamining 
laws concerning the rights of racial minorities or women, both of which 
have had an equally significant role in the drama of liberal politics.  Yet, 
many thoughtful and morally serious thinkers have proposed that there 
might be circumstances in which torture is legally and morally 
permissible.  In fact, Thomas Crocker has gone so far as to propose that 
“substantial academic consensus may exist that in extreme circumstances 
one could imagine justifying the practice of torture as a lesser evil to 
avoid the greater evil of many thousands, or even millions, of innocent 
deaths.”14  What accounts for this seeming blind spot in the principled 
liberalism for which opposition to torture has been a sine qua non?  As 
David Luban has compellingly argued, intelligence gathering “is the 
only rationale for torture that liberal political culture admits could even 
possibly be legitimate.”15  When confronted with a “looming 
catastrophe,” captured most vividly in the ticking time bomb scenario, 
many liberals are unable to sustain their principled rights-based 
opposition to torture.16  Torture under conditions of necessity, notes one 
commentator, “poses a dramatic challenge to our personal beliefs about 
right and wrong[.]”17  Thus, while most liberals support the principle 
that freedom from torture is a fundamental and inviolable human right, 
they are unable to reject in toto the argument that torture might be 
permissible “in gravely dangerous situations[.]”18 
Given the challenge that exigent political circumstances pose to 
liberal principles, it is not surprising that the topic of necessity has been 
                                                 
12 Id. at 647. 
13 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2297 (rev. ed. 1994). 
14 Thomas Crocker, Overcoming Necessity:  Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 
61 SMU L. REV. 2 (2008). 
15 See Luban, supra note 5, at 1436. 
16 Id. at 1439. 
17 Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defense for Torture in the Interrogation of 
Suspected Terrorists?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 786 (2004). 
18 See Luban, supra note 5, at 1436. 
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perhaps the most important and contested aspect of the torture debate.  
The topic most commonly arises in the context of considering whether 
necessity justifies the illegal actions of a government official who 
authorized torture under conditions of grave danger.  As John Alan 
Cohan observes, “Much of the extensive commentary on [torture] has 
alluded to the necessity doctrine as justification for torturing a suspect 
who likely has information concerning a ‘ticking bomb[.]’”19  In this 
respect, the debate over torture and necessity is not narrowly about 
torture, but also about the authority of legal norms and the implications 
of exigent political circumstances, and is ultimately about the nature of 
liberalism itself. 
The concern of this Article is not primarily with the particulars of 
this scholarly debate, but it is important that a brief survey of 
representative positions be offered.  In general, the debate about torture 
and necessity features two competing positions.  The first line of 
argument proposes that necessity defeats the binding prohibition against 
government-sanctioned torture.  A number of arguments have been 
advanced in support of this principle.  Judge Richard Posner, for one, 
argues that with respect to using torture to “ward off a great evil[,]” the 
law should “trust public officers to perceive and act on a moral duty that 
is higher than their legal duty.”20  Confronted with a situation in which 
torture was the only available means of potentially “averting the death 
of thousands, even millions,” the political leader would have “the moral 
and political duty” to authorize torture.21  This duty, he adds, is found in 
the law of necessity, “understood not as law but as the trumping of law 
by necessity[.]”22  It is this law of necessity which “justifie[s]” extralegal 
action by political officials.23  Posner does not address with specificity the 
procedure by which this justification becomes operative, though the clear 
thrust of his argument is that the president should not be subject to 
criminal punishment if torture was sanctioned under true conditions of 
necessity.  The law of necessity thus represents for Posner a supervening 
legal principle to which the “law must adjust” in times of emergency.24 
Posner justifies torture during emergency situations by relying on a 
law of necessity rooted in the Constitution and the inherent authority of 
the Executive.  Other commentators, by contrast, have argued for 
utilizing the criminal law defense of necessity which establishes that 
                                                 
19 See Cohan, supra note 2, at 1587. 
20 RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 85 (2006). 
21 Id. at 86. 
22 Id. at 158. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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“[s]ome acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a 
good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”25  
This line of argument has been adopted, in more or less similar form, by 
a number of commentators.  John Alan Cohan, for instance, concludes 
“that the way to handle torture in an extreme emergency is to recognize 
that, while torture is prohibited, necessity provides an overriding 
justification under the circumstances.”26  Adam Raviv similarly 
concludes, “The defense of necessity or justification can serve as an 
effective means of policing the extreme interrogation of terrorism 
suspects in ticking bomb situations.”27  Offering yet another expression 
of this perspective, John Parry argues that, “If torture provides the last 
remaining chance to save lives in imminent peril, the necessity defense 
should be available to justify the interrogators’ conduct.”28  Parry further 
develops this claim in an article co-authored with Welsh White.  While 
acknowledging that “[t]orture is categorically illegal under international 
law, the federal Constitution and statutes, and state law[,]” White and 
Parry argue that the “necessity defense should be available” for any 
government agent prosecuted for torturing under conditions of danger 
in order “to gain information that would avert a future terrorist act[.]”29  
They emphasize that torture should remain illegal.  Torture, they argue, 
remains wrong in most all circumstances and, for reasons both “moral 
and pragmatic[]” should not be brought within the purview of lawful 
activity.30  Their proposal for permitting the necessity defense in select 
situations thus differs fundamentally from Alan Dershowitz’s oft-
commented upon torture warrant proposal, which would bring 
authorized torture within the bounds of law.  Yet, even while torture 
remains outside of law, the defense of necessity, when applicable, 
provides an excuse from criminal punishment. 
Against the argument that necessity justifies torture is the contrary 
claim that the prohibition against torture binds political officials 
regardless of circumstance.  For proponents of this view, the legal 
prohibition against torture cannot be conditional, but rather binds 
                                                 
25 John Alan Cohan, Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism, 35 STETSON L. REV. 903, 905 
(2006) (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 
(1957)). 
26 See Cohan, supra note 2, at 1631. 
27 Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification:  Defending the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 135, 157 (2004). 
28 John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity:  Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in 
TORTURE:  A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 158. 
29 John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists:  Should Torture Be an 
Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 761, 764 (2002). 
30 Id. at 762. 
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universally, regardless of the exigencies of a particular moment.  That 
necessity offers no justification for torture is clearly established in 
international law.  One scholar summarizes the matter in stating that 
“the right not to be subjected to torture cannot be derogated from, in any 
circumstances.  No emergency situation may allow a state to suspend or 
curtail this fundamental right.  In international criminal law[,] torture is 
banned, both in times of peace and in times of war[.]”31  Yet, more 
significant even than the unconditional prohibition of torture in 
international law is the superstructural role this principle has in 
upholding the integrity and coherence of all liberal rights.  The 
prohibition against torture is foundational to a rights-based political 
regime, and to whittle away at this prohibition harms the moral 
authority of liberalism and the political value of all rights.  The efficacy 
of liberalism, it is maintained, is derived from a deontological 
commitment to certain human rights from which no derogation is 
permissible.  To excuse torture in difficult cases undermines all rights. 
The argument that necessity cannot override the prohibition against 
torture rests on general claims about the authority of law in emergency 
situations, but also reflects views about the particularly abhorrent nature 
of torture.  Scholars have long debated the question of whether and why 
torture is different than other forms of violence.32  The argument that 
torture is different, and thus justly prohibited by law without exception, 
generally considers the damage done to both victim and torturer.  
Michael Ignatieff, for one, has argued that “[a]n absolute prohibition is 
legitimate because in practice such a prohibition relieves a state’s public 
servants from the burden of making intolerable choices, ones that inflict 
irremediable harm both on our enemies and on themselves, on those 
charged with our defense.”33  Jeremy Waldron has similarly considered 
the ways in which religious notions of human dignity make torture 
distinctly problematic.34  What is interesting, however, is that the belief 
that torture undermines and threatens our moral traditions in a 
particularly violent way supports the argument that the legal ban must 
remain sacrosanct.  Christopher Kutz summarizes this line of thinking in 
writing that  
[n]ecessity really does justify overriding some kinds of 
rights claims in many instances, but these are rights of a 
                                                 
31 See Gaeta, supra note 17, at 787. 
32 See Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 124–43 (1978), for an important 
contribution to this debate. 
33 IGNATIEFF, supra note 7, at 142. 
34 See generally Waldron, supra note 10. 
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fundamentally different nature from the ones involved 
in the ticking-bomb example.  Criminal theorists have 
over-generalized the appropriate normative scope of the 
necessity defense by confusing those rights whose 
abrogation the defense can legitimately justify with all 
rights.35 
Waldron makes a similar claim that the legal absolute is appropriate 
for torture because “certain things might just be repugnant to the spirit 
of our law, and . . . torture may be one of them.”36  He proceeds to argue 
that torture holds an “emblematic” and “archetyp[ical]” role within “the 
spirit of our law[.]”37  Thomas Crocker echoes similar themes in arguing 
that permitting torture under necessity “alters the structure of 
constitutional commitments with consequences that are difficult to 
predict or imagine.”  Such an action undermines the “fundamental 
dignity, autonomy, and liberty of persons” which is the foundation of 
“constitutional culture.”38  While necessity might justify certain actions, 
the prohibition of torture is so central to democratic liberal principles 
that exigent political circumstances cannot justify derogation. 
This paper proposes that neither of these two lines of argument 
proves ultimately satisfying.  The argument that law must bind 
unconditionally, even in the midst of an emergency situation, fails to 
reckon with the limits of law or, as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
claim, fails “to come to grips with the inevitability of tragic choices.”39  
This position attempts to bind politics within law in a way that fails to 
account for the possibility of moments for which law cannot provide an 
adequate response.  As Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote from prison during 
World War II,  
In the course of historical life there comes a point where 
the exact observance of the formal law of a 
state . . . suddenly finds itself in violent conflict with the 
ineluctable necessities of the lives of men; at this point 
responsible and pertinent action leaves behind it the 
domain of principle and convention, the domain of the 
                                                 
35 Kutz, supra note 4, at 257. 
36 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:  Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1717 (2005). 
37 Id. at 1717 (discussing the emblematic idea); id. at 1748 (discussing the archetype and 
spirit of our law themes). 
38 Crocker, supra note 14. 
39 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 671, 677 (2006).  
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normal and regular, and is confronted by the 
extraordinary situation of ultimate necessities, a 
situation which no law can control.40 
The argument that law must bind applies ordinary legal logic to a 
state of affairs that lies beyond legal rationality.  At the same time, the 
argument that political necessity excuses torture fails to take seriously 
the implications of this action.  To countenance torture and bring it 
within the bounds of lawful conduct not only undermines foundational 
legal norms but assaults the moral order and humanistic achievements 
on which civilization depends.  In short, those arguing for a 
deontological approach to torture fail to take necessity seriously enough, 
and those arguing for a utilitarian approach to torture do not take order 
seriously enough. 
This Article offers an alternative to these dominant lines of debate in 
the form of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency.  Walzer 
does not specifically address the question of supreme emergency to 
torture, but his writing on this subject, first developed over three 
decades ago, engages issues now being considered again in the torture 
debate.  His perspective, in broad outline, provides that extreme 
circumstances might require political officials to violate legal norms.  At 
the same time, he does not locate the principle of necessity within law, 
nor does he establish necessity as an excuse to legal punishment.  To do 
so, he implies, would domesticate a moment properly understood as 
participating in the darkness of political tragedy.  In his most important 
claim, Walzer instead presents necessity as an ethical concept that 
derives its meaning from the obligations among persons in political 
community.  By neither denying the reality of necessity nor locating 
necessity within law, Walzer reframes the debate about legal authority 
and political action in the midst of crisis. 
One might question the value of this project for our present moment.  
As David Luban writes,  
The real torture debate . . . isn’t about whether to throw 
out the rulebook in the exceptional emergencies.  Rather, 
it’s about what the rulebook says about the ordinary 
interrogation—about whether you can shoot up Qatani 
with saline solution to make him urinate on himself, or 
                                                 
40 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ, the Church, and the World, in THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
FOR MINISTRY 559 (1979).   
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threaten him with dogs in order to find out whether he 
ever met Osama bin Laden.41 
Would our public and academic discourse not be better served by 
clarifying foundational legal principles rather than obfuscating the 
debate with theoretical speculation?  I do not disagree with Luban’s 
assessment of the central challenges in the torture debate.  Yet, we 
should not embrace an overly narrow account of the “real” issues, for 
there is not the stark divide Luban implies between “real” and 
“exceptional” circumstances.  In the end, it is important to consider law’s 
authority during exceptional circumstances as a means of clarifying the 
scope of law’s authority during more ordinary times.  The debate about 
torture and necessity has raised foundational questions about the nature 
of law within a liberal democracy premised on the priority of human 
rights.  The opening provided by this moment of political reflection 
should not be dismissed.  Walzer’s thought is thus not offered as a 
substitute for thinking about more technical questions of legal 
interpretation.  It is offered as a way of clarifying this analysis.  By 
pushing law’s authority to its limits, we can better define the principles 
which govern legal rationality in ordinary time.  Hard cases perhaps 
make bad law, but hard cases also force us to confront our assumptions 
about the meaning of liberalism at its limits. 
II.  “SUPREME EMERGENCY” AND THE OVERRIDING OF LAW 
Walzer’s most important work on necessity appears in the context of 
his writing on “supreme emergency.”  Walzer, it should be noted, does 
not typically use the language of necessity, nor does he write as a legal 
scholar concerned with such matters as executive authority or the 
criminal law defense of necessity.  A political philosopher, Walzer 
develops the concept of supreme emergency in the course of examining 
whether it is permissible to target civilian populations during a just 
war.42  His response, in brief, is that during a supreme emergency it 
might be permissible, perhaps obligatory, that a political leader take 
actions that “override the rights of innocent people and shatter the war 
convention.”43 
Walzer defines supreme emergency in exceedingly narrow terms.  
His aim is to establish “radical limits to the notion of necessity” and to 
                                                 
41 David Luban, Torture, American-Style, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/25/AR2005112501552.html. 
42 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) (Walzer first took up this question in 
his 1977 book, Just and Unjust Wars). 
43 Id. at 259. 
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remove the concept as far as possible from the reality of ordinary 
politics.44  A supreme emergency exists, he thus writes, only “when our 
deepest values and our collective survival are in imminent danger[.]”45  
The existence of this state of affairs is determined by reference to the 
imminence and nature of a threat.46  Neither criterion alone is sufficient 
to give rise to a supreme emergency.  Only a threat that is 
simultaneously both imminent and of extreme danger might be termed a 
supreme emergency.  The threat, in short, must be “of an unusual and 
horrifying kind.”47 
There is a certain imprecision to this definition of supreme 
emergency, as there unavoidably must be.  As a result, Walzer turns to 
historical examples, in particular, the Nazi threat to England between 
1940 and 1942, to illustrate supreme emergency.  Nazism, Walzer writes, 
“was a threat to human values so radical that its imminence would 
surely constitute a supreme emergency[.]”48  It is only when confronted 
by an “ultimate horror[]” such as this that the “rule of necessity” permits 
violating the rights of others in order to “save a nation[.]”49  It is in light 
of this principle that Walzer concludes that the British bombing of 
German civilian targets was permissible.50  Yet, Walzer adds that the 
circumstances had so changed after 1942 that this conduct was no longer 
permitted.51  The supreme emergency had ended.  Absent this 
precondition, it was no longer morally permissible “to override the 
rights of innocent people” for the sake of national preservation.52  On this 
point Walzer is particularly clear:  extralegal action that violates human 
rights cannot be justified simply to minimize losses or hasten the end of 
conflict.53  For these reasons, Walzer concludes that the bombing of 
Hiroshima was without justification.  Only when a threat is truly 
civilizational in nature—that is, when it threatens to destroy the nation’s 
“commitment to continuity across generations”—does acting outside of 
law become a possibility.54 
                                                 
44 Id. at 261. 
45 MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 33 (2004). 
46 WALZER, supra note 42, at 252. 
47 Id. at 253. 
48 Id. at 253. 
49 Id. at 254. 
50 Id. at 261. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 259. 
53 Id. at 266. 
54 WALZER, supra note 45, at 43.  Walzer does not specifically address the scope of the 
warrant to act outside the law, nor the process by which a political official determines 
which rules might be overridden.  It seems clear, however, that a political official should 
limit extralegal action as much as is practicable and should only violate a law when doing 
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During supreme emergency, necessity becomes the rule against 
which ordinary laws are judged.  The “rule of necessity” provides the 
“highest values” to which the leader is obligated.55  It is thus no longer 
fidelity to law, but fidelity to a higher order of responsibility that defines 
the vocation of the political official.  However, if supreme emergency 
warrants political officials to operate without regard to ordinarily 
binding legal norms, what becomes of law’s authority?  Does the rule of 
necessity negate the legal principles that govern political conduct under 
ordinary circumstances?  Walzer’s response to these questions most 
vividly reveals the relationship between supreme emergency and the 
approaches to necessity offered in the torture debate referenced above. 
Walzer’s position is that law does not bind during a supreme 
emergency because ordinary legal logic ceases to meaningfully address 
the strained state of affairs.  Supreme emergency, he writes, “describes 
those rare moments when the negative value that we assign—that we 
can’t help assigning—to the disaster that looms before us devalues 
morality itself and leaves us free to do what is militarily necessary to 
avoid the disaster[.]”56  During these uncommon situations, the “rights 
normality[,]” which ordinarily binds political conduct, ceases to hold 
value.  The “moral stakes” are simply too high for ordinary rules.57  In 
making such claims, however, Walzer does not argue that supreme 
emergency negates the validity of the underlying legal norm.  The norm 
remains valid.  It is rather that the exigencies of the moment compel 
fidelity to a higher rule of necessity.  The rule of necessity has greater 
pull than the ordinary laws of the state, yet the rule exists outside of law.  
It is not a principle within law.  It is other than law.  As such, the 
demands of law remain incontrovertible even as radically contingent 
circumstances require deviation from law.  In Walzer’s phraseology, a 
supreme emergency requires that laws be “overridden” but not be “set 
                                                                                                             
so is necessary to the immediate objective of overcoming the threat posed by supreme 
emergency.  Walzer’s case study of bombing civilian targets seemingly indicates that the 
decision to inflict unlawful violence against others must be assessed in a fact specific 
manner.  The warrant which a leader acquires during supreme emergency to violate laws is 
not a blanket authority.  The leader is not transmuted by virtue of necessity into an 
unalloyed sovereign who might act without respect to the bindingness of law.  The ruler 
remains embedded within the web of the law, and a decision to authorize violence that 
operates against these norms must emerge out of a deliberate and morally serious process 
of reflection. 
55 WALZER, supra note 42, at 254. 
56 WALZER, supra note 45, at 40. 
57 Michael Walzer, Political Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE:  A 
COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 73. 
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aside, canceled, or annulled.”58  This arrangement, Walzer often notes, is 
similar to civil disobedience.59 
By characterizing the rule of necessity in this way, Walzer refuses to 
grant supreme emergency any final autonomy.  The rule of necessity 
remains an aberration, even as it operates authoritatively.  As a 
consequence, the rule of necessity does not free political officials from 
judgment for the extralegal actions they authorize during a supreme 
emergency.  Necessity for Walzer is not a supervening legal norm that 
excuses judgment.  It is a temporary warrant which permits the ruler to 
operate apart from law, in a parallel source of authority.  But the rule of 
necessity must ultimately return to the law as it operates in ordinary 
time.  Freedom and limitation exist in creative tension during supreme 
emergency.  The ruler who acts in contravention of law does so with 
freedom from the immediate bounds of law, yet cannot escape the final 
judgment of law.  The rule of necessity is not an end in itself, but finds its 
ultimate resolution only in a return to law that inaugurates judgment 
upon actions taken in supreme emergency.  Although Walzer does not 
“defend any particular view on punishment[,]” warranted extralegal 
action undertaken during supreme emergency is necessarily paired with 
guilt and judgment.60  Through the return to law, the authority of the 
legal order is upheld and the moral order is restored. 
In upholding the authority of law, even as it is temporarily 
overridden by the rule of necessity, Walzer develops a fundamentally 
different perspective from those who define necessity as excuse and 
justification.  As discussed above, those advancing this latter position 
argue that the binding authority of law is defeated by a superior legal 
principle of necessity.  The prohibition against torture thus has no effect 
when violated under certain conditions of necessity.  For Walzer, on the 
other hand, the temporary silence of law during supreme emergency 
does not negate law but rather triggers a search for a source of political 
authority outside of law.  Walzer finds the authority to act in 
contravention of law in the realm of ethics and, in particular, in the 
                                                 
58 Id. at 68. 
59 Id. at 72. 
60 Id. at 73.  Although Walzer refers here to formal legal punishment, he speaks of 
punishment in broader terms.  In fact, he adds, 
Moral rules are not usually enforced against the sort of actor I am 
considering, largely because he acts in an official capacity. . . .  In any 
case, there seems no way to establish or enforce the punishment.  Short 
of the priest and the confessional, there are no authorities to whom we 
might entrust the task.   
Walzer illustrates this process of judgment in his discussion of the “[d]ishonoring” of 
Arthur Harris, who directed the bombing of Germany from 1942 until the end of the war.  
WALZER, supra note 42, at 323–25. 
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obligations among persons in community.  Walzer’s account of the 
enduring authority of the legal norm during supreme emergency thus 
rests on a broader claim about the relationship between law and morality 
during supreme emergency.  It is to this subject that this Article now 
turns. 
III.  LAW, JUDGMENT, AND THE RESTORATION OF MORAL ORDER 
A. Law and Morality in Supreme Emergency 
Much of the debate concerning torture focuses on the question of 
whether there exists a legal principle that warrants illegal actions under 
conditions of necessity.  For Walzer, by contrast, necessity is best 
understood as a moral rather than legal category.  Above all, the warrant 
for acting outside law during a supreme emergency is not based in a 
legal principle but rather in supra-legal moral obligations that inform 
political life.  In short, this Article proposes that supreme emergency 
rests on establishing law and morality as distinct loci of political 
authority, with the latter providing the content of responsible action 
during conditions of necessity.  As such, Walzer shifts the discussion of 
necessity from law to morality. 
This division between law and morality is pertinent only during 
supreme emergency.  Under ordinary political circumstances, the public 
obligations of an official are determined solely by the requirements of 
law.  Moral obligations possess no authority under such conditions to 
warrant official action in contravention of the law.  Law binds 
unconditionally.  In this respect, it is law’s morality that must guide 
officials during ordinary time.  In an earlier essay, for instance, Walzer 
describes the duties of state officials in terms of acting solely within the 
bounds of law:  “The state can thus be described as a purely external 
limit on group action, but it must be added that the precise point at 
which the limit becomes effective cannot be left for state officials to 
decide.  For them, the law must be the limit.”61 
Walzer advances a broadly positivistic conception of law, at least 
insofar as he presents law as categorically distinct from morality.  At the 
same time, Walzer views law and morality as necessarily intertwined 
within the economy of political decision-making.  Law, in this respect, is 
not subject to morality, nor does it lack significant points of contact with 
morality.  A full account of politics must take account of both.  This is 
above all the case during conditions of necessity, which gives rise to 
                                                 
61 Michael Walzer, The Obligation To Disobey the Law, in LAW AND MORALITY 129, 140 
(Don Welch ed., 1987). 
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circumstances in which law and morality create dissonant obligations.  
In particular, the situation creates tension between the obligation to law 
and the obligation to prevent “nullification” of the community.62  Stated 
differently, supreme emergency creates conflict between laws “founded 
on a conception of rights that transcends all immediate considerations[]” 
and the existential demands of supreme emergency that transcend the 
ordinary bounds of political life.63 
It is impossible to simultaneously uphold both obligations.  While in 
ordinary time, a leader defers to the binding norms of law, during 
supreme emergency a leader might be required to follow obligations to 
the community.  Thus, there is a tension, indeed a vocational dissonance, 
at the existential fringes of politics.  Law alone cannot offer a full account 
of political obligation in this moment, and only by opening law to the 
demands of morality can the crisis be understood. 
Even as the source of authority during supreme emergency shifts 
from law to morality, law continues to establish obligations to which all 
are subject.  Supreme emergency does not negate law or create a zone of 
autonomy within which a political leader can operate without regard to 
the law.  Nor is political necessity an excuse that lifts the judgment upon 
those actions that violate law.  Rather, during supreme emergency, law 
and morality exist as dueling and equally authoritative loci of authority.  
What has changed is that the higher vocation of moral obligation 
temporarily grants officials the warrant, and perhaps the obligation, to 
act contrary to law. 
B. The Ties That Bind:  The Sources of Moral Obligation  
By locating necessity within the sphere of moral obligation, Walzer 
avoids equating necessity with lawlessness.  Rather, extralegal action 
taken during supreme emergency is simultaneously warranted and 
unlawful.  Such acts therefore stand between the yes and the no of 
history—between the transcendent demands of necessity and the norms 
of law established in ordinary time.  Even as necessity calls forth the 
need to act in contravention of law, law stands in judgment of this 
decision.  As such, the ruler upon whom the necessity of extralegal 
action is placed must “accept the burdens of criminality[.]”64 
Justifying the authority of moral obligation within Walzer’s scheme 
requires understanding what Walzer means by moral obligation.  When 
Walzer refers to moral obligation, he is not speaking of an ethereal code, 
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nor is he writing about the subjective moral beliefs a person holds.  
Rather, Walzer’s account of moral obligation emerges out of his 
understanding of community.65  A moral obligation in the realm of 
politics derives its efficacy from the communitarian relations among 
persons.  The act of necessity, in other words, cannot be isolated from the 
moral logic of the community.  Political officials, even just officials who 
make the tragic decision to override law, do not stand outside the moral 
community of which they are a part.  The moral life, Walzer notes, is a 
“social phenomenon[.]”66  The decision to override law emerges 
therefore not from the courageous and defiant will of an isolated leader 
but from the dialogical nature of moral engagement. 
In an essay published a decade prior to Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer 
writes, “Disobedience, when it is not criminally but morally, religiously, 
or politically motivated, is almost always a collective act, and it is 
justified by the values of the collectivity and the mutual engagements of 
its members.”67  This statement reveals early stirrings of Walzer’s 
understanding of the communal foundations of political morality, a 
theme which undergirds his later claims concerning supreme 
emergency.  This collectivity, as Walzer describes it, refers to something 
more capacious and meaningful than the citizenry of a nation-state, 
although the collectivity will typically take this form.  Rather, the 
community of persons who create obligations are a people united in the 
project of constructing and sustaining culture, moral traditions, and 
social order.  The decision to act in violation of law, within the context of 
supreme emergency, is therefore better understood as an affirmation of 
the duty to sustain the collective rather than as a rejection of the 
collectivity’s moral judgments reflected in law.  This broader framework 
within which necessity should be evaluated is lost when the subject is 
considered exclusively from the perspective of legal rights. 
In general, the moral life of a community does not oppose law but 
rather feeds its development.  As Daniel Warner writes, “for 
Walzer, . . . the experience of coming up with rules is part of the social 
process in a liberal society[.]”  The rules which take shape to guide a 
social order “reflect the historic community and the desires of its 
members.”68  Under ordinary circumstances, law is properly reflective of 
the moral life of a political community.  Yet, in moments of supreme 
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66 Walzer, supra note 57, at 66. 
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emergency, law can no longer operate as the sole determinant of just 
political action.  Rather, law and morality, which in ordinary time 
operate in tandem, become distinct and competing sources of obligation.  
Obligation to law and obligation to the moral demands of community 
pull in opposite directions, and necessity pushes the axis of obligation 
from the former to the latter.  When thus faced with an ultimate decision 
between law and morality, a leader might be called upon to side with the 
latter.  As Walzer writes, when moments of “evil and imminent danger” 
threaten the survival of the community, the leader must “accept the 
burdens of criminality here and now[]” for the sake of “our history” and 
“our future[.]”69 
Walzer’s claim that moments arise in which the leader must break 
the law for the sake of the community is a bold assertion that demands 
further consideration.  What is it about the community which demands 
political officials to break the law?  Walzer never discusses this question 
specifically, but an answer emerges from the general logic of his writings 
on supreme emergency.  Obligation to community holds such authority 
because community, for Walzer, is ultimately prior to the law.  Because 
law emerges out of the moral life of the community, and is sustained and 
made meaningful through its participation in the lived life of a people, 
law possesses no final autonomy from the community.  As such, when a 
supreme emergency imperils the existence of a people, it is not only 
appropriate but morally obligatory that the ruler break the law for the 
sake of preserving that upon which the law depends.  A community 
possesses an “ongoingness[]” whose vitality cannot be contained within 
law alone.70  It is important to recall in this context that supreme 
emergency is a situation in which the survival of people—its 
ongoingness—is threatened.  Such a threat, Walzer notes, is “a loss that 
is greater than any we can imagine[.]”71  It would be foolhardy in such a 
situation to propose that the community perish so that its laws might be 
upheld. 
Viewed in this broader context, Walzer’s approach to political 
necessity reveals itself to be rooted more in relationality than principle.  
Put differently, Walzer approaches necessity from the perspective of the 
duties persons owe rather than the rights they are owed.  Walzer pushes 
liberal discourse away from a procedural and substantive discussion of 
                                                 
69 WALZER, supra note 42, at 260.  Walzer’s position rests on an account of the 
community that is not unproblematic.  He seems at points to absolutize, even sacralize, the 
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rights toward a broader conception of human relations.  Walzer is not, of 
course, rejecting the concept of rights in toto, but he is supplementing 
liberal rights talk with a consideration of the moral duties which texture 
political life.  Duty is a central concept, for Walzer, because “[n]o 
political theory which does not move beyond rights to duties . . . can ever 
explain what men actually do when they disobey or rebel, or why they 
do so.”72  The limitations of rights are most fully displayed in a supreme 
emergency, during which the moral vocabulary of duties offers a fuller 
account of the obligations incumbent upon a political leader.  The 
language of rights might be adequate to describe the ordinary 
mechanism of government, but Walzer warns of the danger of 
absolutizing rights in a way that obfuscates the supervening moral 
obligations to community. 
C. The Judgment of Law and the Ruler as Scapegoat 
While moral obligation to community warrants extralegal action 
during supreme emergency, the law is not ultimately defeated.  Rather, 
the law is upheld and, in the aftermath of supreme emergency, brings 
judgment upon those violative actions taken, albeit necessarily and 
rightfully, during the crisis.  Walzer treats necessity as a circumstance 
that justifies extralegal action but does not remove the legal prohibition.  
In his refusal to make necessity the basis for overturning the legal order, 
Walzer echoes Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s warning that in moments of crisis, 
“The true order is completely reversed if the ultima ratio itself is 
converted into a rational law, if the peripheral case is treated as the 
normal, and if necessità is made a technique.”73  By upholding the norms 
of legal order, even if a deviation is permitted, Walzer refuses to permit 
necessity to become a principle.  Even justifiable actions taken during a 
state of exception must be denominated transgressive.  Walzer writes 
that the rules “still stand and have this much effect at least:  that we 
know we have done something wrong even if what we have done was 
also the best thing to do on the whole in the circumstances.”74  
Permitting necessity to negate law would undermine the civilizational 
accomplishment of law and, even more so, defeat the moral foundations 
of the social order that make law meaningful. 
This retention of law’s judgment does more than prevent necessity 
from becoming a freestanding normative principle.  The upholding of 
law also resets the moral foundations of the social order and reunites the 
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legal and moral spheres of authority.  The judgment of law pulls the 
nation back within the boundedness of law and reinforces those norms 
from which no escape is permitted.  The judgment of law remains, for it 
is this judgment that restores moral order in the aftermath of tragic 
violence.  While necessity allows for the possibility of transcending the 
bounds of law, the judgment of law reasserts the moral limits of politics.  
Through judgment, law and morality, which had occupied distinct 
spheres of authority during supreme emergency, are again united. 
Yet Walzer does not stop here.  Legal judgment not only restores the 
connectedness of law and morality but participates in the process of 
political redemption.  Upholding the rule makes the official who acted 
out of necessity a scapegoat who bears the sins of the nation.  Law makes 
known these sins for, as Walzer writes, it requires that the official 
“acknowledge and bear (and perhaps . . . repent and do penance for) his 
guilt[.]”75  The military commander or political official who overrides the 
rules of war is forced to bear the burden of having done that which was 
necessary and appropriate.  By targeting civilians, Walzer writes, 
government officials become “murderers, though in a good cause. . . .  
They have killed . . . for the sake of justice[.]”76  They have acquired 
“dirty hands[]” in the pursuit of an appropriate end. 77  Such is the 
paradox of acting in violation of law under conditions of supreme 
emergency.  That which was “necessary and right was also wrong.”78  
This is the irreconcilable tension that defines the nature of supreme 
emergency:  it is murderous and good, violative and just, right and 
wrong. 
One might protest that Walzer is simply playing fast and loose with 
linguistic distinctions that hold little meaning.  Yet, this would miss the 
point.  Walzer is not trying to have his cake and eat it too.  Rather, he 
identifies the judgment of law upon just actions as a way of reckoning 
with the tragic and paradoxical nature of politics.  This response to 
tragedy is ultimately inadequate.  In some sense, no response to a 
supreme emergency could be adequate, given that such a state of affairs, 
as Gilbert Meilaender observes, offers “no moral solution[.]”79  It is 
perhaps for this reason that Walzer’s tension-filled account of judgment 
seemingly opens the political to the transcendent.  In the ritual of 
judgment and punishment, which follows supreme emergency, Walzer 
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reaches after something that is religious in nature.80  The scapegoated 
ruler, forced to bear deserved guilt for just deeds, is sacrificed in a ritual 
that is sacred as well as legal.  Even though it is law that restores 
normalcy in the aftermath of supreme emergency, law alone cannot 
account for the moral paradox which confronts a social order at the 
limits of law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION:  SUPREME EMERGENCY AND TORTURE 
Broadly speaking, Walzer’s approach to necessity represents a third 
way between the dominant lines of argument found in the torture 
debate.  On one hand, he rejects the claim that a principle of necessity 
ought to justify extralegal actions committed by state officials.  On the 
other hand, he rejects an absolutist position that necessity ought to not 
permit violation of foundational legal principles.  In short, we might 
summarize Walzer’s position as follows:  there are moments when 
necessity authorizes and compels officials to act contrary to law, but 
necessity does not cancel law nor bring such actions within the authority 
of law.  Yet, Walzer ultimately seeks to offer more than a middle way 
between the demands of law and necessity.  This Article has argued, 
rather, that by establishing law and morality as distinct loci of authority, 
Walzer moves beyond the either/or approach that defines the current 
torture debates.  His alternative does not diminish the authority of law, 
but does embed law within a multi-textured framework.  In the end, 
Walzer proposes that a full analysis of right action under conditions of 
necessity requires taking account of the distinct yet cooperative functions 
provided by legal and moral norms. 
Much has been said about Walzer’s views on law, morality, and 
supreme emergency.  How then might his approach to these subjects 
inform the debate on government-sanctioned torture under conditions of 
necessity?  First, Walzer’s writings on supreme emergency complicate 
the idea of necessity.  Supreme emergency represents a moment of 
potential societal collapse, a “desperate time[]” when “our deepest 
values and our collective survival are in imminent danger[.]”81  
Necessity, in short, is limited to those incalculably rare moments that 
threaten the foundations of the social order.  Without diminishing the 
horrific prospects raised by the typical ticking time bomb scenario, this 
state of affairs does not meet the definition of a supreme emergency.  
Necessity, for Walzer, represents a genuine existential crisis that cannot 
be domesticated within ordinary politics. 
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In defining supreme emergency this way, Walzer establishes “limits” 
to necessity that radically circumscribe the exercise of extralegal state 
violence.82  Supreme emergency is not, he emphasizes, a “permissive 
doctrine.”83  In fact, far from encouraging deviation from law, “supreme 
emergency strengthens rights normality by guaranteeing its possession 
of the greater part, by far, of the moral world.”84  Short of reaching a 
moment in which “we are face-to-face not merely with defeat but with a 
defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community[,]” a political 
official lacks authority to engage in actions that violate the laws of war.85  
This stands in contrast to the approach taken in the ticking time bomb 
scenario, which facilely invokes the language of necessity.  This tendency 
to normalize political necessity is reflective of a broader trend within 
modernity by which “‘the state of exception . . . has become the rule[.]’”86  
Supreme emergency resists such normalization of the exception. 
The implications of Walzer’s position are clear though 
uncomfortable:  there might be moments of genuine political strife in 
which a society must endure suffering and even defeat rather than 
upending the legal and moral foundations of the society.  Recall that 
Walzer concludes the bombing of Hiroshima to have been unjust, even 
though pursued to hasten the end of war and limit the number of 
military casualties.  Considerations such as “the speed or the scope of 
victory[]” have no role in determining rightful conduct.87  The rights of 
Japanese citizens, grounded in the principles governing conduct in war, 
demand respect.  In short, there are things that must ultimately be 
valued more than mere expedience:  “our civilization and morality, our 
collective abhorrence of murder, even when it seems, as it always does, 
to serve some purpose.”88  Walzer thus concludes that “the deliberate 
slaughter of innocent men and women cannot be justified simply 
because it saves the lives of other men and women.”89  Even amidst the 
ravages of war, necessity must remain beyond the pale of mere 
utilitarian calculation.  While analogizing between innocent Japanese 
civilians and the captured detainee in a ticking time bomb scenario is not 
without problems, the relevant legal norm does not bind because of the 
status of those whose rights it protects.  It binds because it reflects the 
                                                 
82 WALZER, supra note 42, at 268. 
83 WALZER, supra note 45, at 50. 
84 Id. 
85 WALZER, supra note 42, at 268. 
86 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 6 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
2006) (2003) (quoting Walter Benjamin). 
87 WALZER, supra note 42, at 268. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/3
2009] Torture, Necessity, and Supreme Emergency 1611 
deepest moral principles and aspirations of a society.  Thus, just as the 
warrant for extralegal action emerges out of the moral obligation to 
community, so too do the limits placed on political action.  Just as a 
leader has an obligation to preserve the community for the future, so too 
does the leader have an obligation to honor the inherited moral 
traditions.  The moral community provides the yes and the no.  It 
empowers as it limits.  Absent supreme emergency there is no warrant 
for contemplating an override of these foundational norms.  The 
prohibition against torture ought to be no different in this respect than 
laws that prohibit the targeting of civilians. 
Even as Walzer radically limits the scope of necessity, he 
nevertheless maintains that there are moments in which the ordinary 
authority of law is overturned.  During supreme emergency, binding 
principles of law give way to the dynamic demands of history, and it is 
to these demands that a political official must respond.  Whether under 
such conditions a leader might authorize torture is a question to which, 
on Walzer’s terms, we cannot give a simple answer.  The answer is to be 
found only in the particularities of history as they present themselves to 
a community and its leaders.  All the same, Walzer’s theory cannot be 
taken to absolutely close off the possibility of torture. 
The thrust of Walzer’s position is to reject a politics of absolutes.  
“[W]hen disaster looms[]” and “the heavens are really about to fall[,]” 
Walzer charges, falling back on the absolutist claim that certain actions 
simply ought to never be done represents a failure to appreciate the 
nature of the present evil and the tragic circumstances confronting the 
polity.90  To bind necessity within such a rule is to ignore the radically 
contingent and tragic nature of the moment necessity creates.  Rather 
than seeking an a priori principle that determines if necessity might 
justify torture, Walzer suggests that the proper response is to live into 
history and its vicissitudes and limitations. 
A supreme emergency is a moment in which the only response 
might be an “immoral” response that rejects the “normal defense of 
rights[.]”91  This situation is tragic, to be sure, and one from which 
society must seek rapid escape.  But there nevertheless are circumstances 
in which the call of history demands political officials to draw society 
into complicity with the tragic potential of human affairs.  The tragic 
nature of the situation cannot be denied, as absolutists seek to do, nor 
can the immoral response offered be negated, as sought by those offering 
necessity as a legal justification.  Supreme emergency is a situation for 
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which no simple principled response can be offered.92  It is a moment of 
“paradox” that defies our ordinary rules.93  As such, Walzer’s account of 
supreme emergency pushes debate away from the question of whether 
the law of necessity justifies the use of torture and pulls debate into the 
moral darkness and legal silence that exists at the existential fringes of 
politics:  a place where the leader “knows that he can’t do what he has to 
do—and finally does.”94  In a supreme emergency, “the rule of 
necessity”—a rule that “knows no rules[]”—is the guiding principle for 
political officials.95  To delimit in advance the content of proper action 
under a ruleless rule is to deny the nature of supreme emergency.  The 
burden of making a decision about that which must be done falls 
squarely upon the ruler in this moment. 
This position will be unsatisfying to many.  It offers no clear 
principle of action.  Yet it is precisely the quest for certainty that Walzer 
resists.  Instead of seeking certainty, Walzer complicates a debate that 
aims in its dominant form to bind the tragic within legal rationality.  
Both of the approaches outlined above avoid an encounter with what 
Augustine describes as the “darkness” of “social life.”  Yet, for Walzer, 
the only adequate response to necessity involves wrestling with the 
complexities that define the relationship between tragedy and 
democratic liberalism.  It is into that dark space, neither transcendent nor 
pedestrian, to which the debate must move, so that we might more ably 
confront what Reinhold Niebuhr describes as “the confusion which 
always exists in the area of life where politics and ethics meet[.]”96 
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